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This paper traces the international history of Eastern Europe in the 20th century
within the analytical framework of the national self-determination/independence
paradigm. It argues that in 1918 the allied powers dissolved the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy in the hope that the newly established nation states would strengthen Eu-
ropean stability and would balance Russian and German power. The Munich agree-
ment was not a mistake but a conscious effort to reorganize the continent on a more
stable basis after it turned out that the international system created for middle Eu-
rope in Paris was not working. Thereafter Great Britain strove to achieve continental
balance by surrendering the region to German, later to Soviet hegemony. This
would also be the policy of the United States until 1948 when the Truman adminis-
tration decided that the restoration of national independence in Eastern Europe
would create a safer Europe. After the failure of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution the
U.S. returned to the position that continental stability took precedence over the inde-
pendence of the Soviet satellites, a view shared by the major NATO allies. This re-
mained the Western position through 1989. The restoration of national independ-
ence and continental reunification originated in Eastern Europe, which for the first
time since 1918 was a policy maker in the international arena.
Keywords: national self-determination, continental stability, security, World
War I, Paris treaties, the Munich Conference, World War II, 1956 Hungarian Revo-
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National Self Determination vs. Continental Security and Stability
The Habsburg Monarchy, which had dominated the Central European scene for
half a millennium went to war in 1914 to preserve its territorial integrity. Edward
Grey noted ominously: “The lamps are out all over Europe. We shall not see them
lit again in our time.” The quest for more security ended in self-destruction. When
Austria-Hungary’s effort to sign a separate peace failed, it seemed to outlive its
usefulness as a balance between Russia and Germany. When the Entente powers
decided to dissolve the Monarchy into independent national entities, they were
primarily motivated by strategic calculations. Some in the British Foreign Office
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were unconvinced that anything better would come from dissolving the Monarchy
but such views were brushed aside. In fact it looked as though that, the new states
would constitute an effective buffer zone between Germany and Soviet Russia.
National independence and stability were seen as mutually reinforcing principles.
Containing Bolshevism in Russia was a key factor in redrawing the boundaries of
Central Europe. Strategically important railroads, which would facilitate mobili-
zation against Russia, were given to “friendly” successor states even at the price
of violating ethnic self-determination. Territory was granted in accordance with
the security services each state was expected to provide for Britain and France, the
chief beneficiaries being Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. Territorial
awards were thus meant to increase stability in Eastern Europe. As it turned out,
the unintended, although not quite unforeseen consequence was the opposite: re-
visionist sentiment in Germany, Soviet Russia, Hungary and even Bulgaria led to
the disruption of Middle Europe. Instead of more security the allies ended up with
less.
The high hopes attached to national independence as a stabilizing factor in
Central Europe quickly faded as the former entente powers were unable to stabi-
lize the economies and politics of the newly created states. Only a few years after
dismembering the Monarchy the Foreign Office and even the Quai D’Orsay
thought of resuscitating the old. In fact the restoration of the economic unity and
thereby the political integrity of Austria-Hungary was an elusive goal both Lon-
don and Paris would seek. But Humpty Dumpty could not be put together again:
Central Europe’s “pauper states” as the British called them were hopelessly di-
vided between revisionist and status quo powers. Neither the British nor the
French were willing to provide workable security guarantees for their clients. A
case in point was Romania which sought, but never received French guarantee
against the Soviets for Bessarabia. Neither was France willing to guarantee the
Little Entente against the Hungarians. Economic recovery was obstructed by na-
tionalist isolation, some of the new states, including Hungary and Austria seemed
unviable. At the same time the victors competed for influence in what they saw as
a zero sum game. Paris and Rome constructed their respective blocs while London
was wary of the undue influence France enjoyed in the center of Europe, prompt-
ing it to give up its anti-Hungarian stance and support Budapest against the bloc
sponsored by the French.
But as recent scholarship has shown, Britain wrote off Central Europe by the
end of the 1920s. Even though Paris offered paper guarantees to its allies in the
mid 1930s they were not intended to be kept. London was unable to find a pillar on
which to base its influence in Eastern Europe. Even Czechoslovakia was a disap-
pointment, because it obstructed regional reconciliation. “All these states”, wrote
permanent undersecretary of foreign affairs Robert Vansittart, “like France are
obsessed by anxiety to keep what they got out of the war and to preserve the status
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quo against those neighbors whom the war despoiled… their peppery weakness
and local brawls have been a disappointment (they are) unreliable allies in the pur-
suit of this haunting and evasive ‘security’”. The newly created states in Central
Europe rapidly outlived their usefulness for Western security. Both London and
Paris hoped that Germany could be satisfied in middle Europe. Appeasement can-
not be explained with unsatisfactory military preparedness or the desire to avoid
war at all costs only. Recent scholarship indicates that disenchantment with the in-
ternational system created in Paris played a role; it was hoped that new boundaries
in Central Europe and German mastery there will bring about a more just peace
and hence a more stable continent. German hegemony over the smaller states was
not seen as threat but rather as an enhancement of Western security. In 1938 Aus-
tria was annexed by the Reich. Thereafter the western powers bullied Czechoslo-
vakia into accepting Hitler’s demands and arbitrated its partition. Chamberlain re-
turned from Munich genuinely convinced that it was possible to remodel Europe
in a peaceful and just manner. French officials stated that the British and the
French almost went to war to boost up a state that was not viable. In 1939 Czecho-
slovakia was dismembered, neither Britain nor France honored their commitment
to guarantee Czechoslovakia’s borders on the grounds that the state had ceased to
exist before Germany invaded it. British objectives would not be impeded by Ger-
man control of Central Europe. When Hitler destroyed Czechoslovakia precisely
two decades after it was helped to life by British liberals Chamberlain explained
British inaction: “The object that we have in mind is of too great a significance to
the happiness of mankind for us to lightly give it up.”
In August and September 1939 Berlin and Moscow divided the north eastern
tier, Poland was destroyed as an independent state. It seemed that Europe’s fate
would be arbitrated by Hitler and Stalin. There began a German–Soviet scramble
for the Balkans. Stalin seized Bessarabia, which was assigned to him by Hitler and
annexed the strategically placed Northern Bukovina, which was not. While Hitler
attacked the Low Lands and France, Stalin first went for Finland and then, simul-
taneously with Hitler’s campaign in the west, annexed the Baltic States. France
and Great Britain planned intervention against the Soviets but nothing came of it.
Scores were settled with Romania, and Europe seemed to be ready for a new peace
conference orchestrated by Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini. The new concert was
brought to naught when Molotov’s talks in Berlin failed in November 1940 over
Bulgaria. Germany emerged as the dominant power, attracting the still independ-
ent states of the Balkans and middle Europe like a magnet. Stalin hoped to join the
Tripartite Pact, but by then Hitler decided to crush his main ideological opponent.
Even as the Wehrmacht was closing in on Moscow, Stalin told Anthony Eden
that the USSR would extend its sphere of influence into Eastern Europe. Stalin
would get from the British what Hitler did not deliver: control of the Balkans. Hit-
ler’s satellites, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria hoped that they would be saved
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by a British–American occupation. Instead, in November 1943 the Allies decided
to provoke their German occupation without regards to the consequences. The
motive was to spread the Germans thin in Normandy and the eastern theater of
war. As Allen Dulles put it: “we are up to our elbow in blood, a few hundred thou-
sand lives will not matter.” Previously satellite attempts to defect from the Axis
had been brushed aside. After the decision was made to open the second front in
Normandy, satellite defection was encouraged to force Hitler to invade them,
thereby tying down German troops. As the State Department cynically put it:
“Adolf [Hitler] aware of decision and informing his boys”, German domination
would be followed by another occupation, this time Soviet.
Only five years after the north-eastern tier was partitioned between Germany
and Russia, in October 1944 Churchill and Stalin divided the Balkans. Churchill
later claimed that the percentage agreement was meant to be a temporary arrange-
ment. In reality the Foreign Office had been thinking along these lines since 1942.
Romania, the Foreign Office confided to the State Department in early 1943,
would be given “to the wolves” and Soviet influence would prevail in the other
adjacent countries as well. A formal offer of Romania for Greece had been made
to Stalin in early 1944. Roosevelt, who planned a British-Soviet condominium in
Europe, applauded the “meeting of minds” between the British and Soviets.
American inaction behind the iron curtain until 1948 was not caused by the lack of
leverage on the Soviets alone. Rather, Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe was
not so bad for the Americans, who would not take part in the stabilization of Cen-
tral Europe. The joint chiefs ruled out American participation in military opera-
tions in the Balkans citing Soviet superiority; Roosevelt and his military advisors
opposed even a subsidiary operation advocated by Churchill. Roosevelt was
known for his disinterest in Eastern Europe and under his first presidency Truman
did not evidence much either. The Soviet Union’s borders as established by the
Hitler-Stalin Pact were left standing and the Churchill-Stalin arrangement for
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece were not seriously challenged either.
The U.S. and Britain were virtually shut out of the Soviet-occupied areas;
Voroshilov expressed the Soviet mentality succinctly: “this is our territory and we
will say who can enter”. Hungarian party leader Rákosi proclaimed May 1946: as
soon as the peace treaties are signed the “proletariat will be liberated”.
Paris saw no security challenge in the westward expansion of the Soviet Union,
and neither did the U.S. until 1948. Then an abrupt shift occurred in Washington’s
position towards Eastern Europe. Rather than regarding Soviet hegemony in East-
ern Europe as a stabilizing or at least acceptable condition, the second Truman ad-
ministration hoped to roll back Soviet power and restore national independence.
The Soviet military occupation of Central Europe was now considered as a threat
since Eastern Europe “extended Soviet power into the heart of Europe”. The
United States came to see national independence in Eastern Europe and European
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security as mutually reinforcing conditions. Vigorous policies were implemented
to realize the ambitious goal until by 1953, Soviet nuclear capabilities made sub-
version and covert operations too dangerous to pursue. The Eisenhower–Dulles
platform announced roll back and liberation arguing that the Soviet domination of
Eastern Europe was immoral and a threat to U.S. security. Scholarship has empha-
sized Soviet nuclear deterrence in explaining why the Republican administration
backed down from its commitment to liberate Eastern Europe. Yet this explana-
tion fails to explain why Eisenhower did not explore the possibilities of putting
any pressure on Khrushchev in 1956 when the Hungarian war of liberation (and
the simultaneous turmoil in Poland) brought Moscow in a critical situation. Ulti-
mately the Eisenhower administration may not have found Soviet hegemony less
desirable than a retraction of Soviet power. This would bring the United States on
the same page as its European allies, none of which saw any advantage in pushing
the Soviets out of Eastern Europe.
By the time of the Prague Spring in 1968 the U.S. had completely reappraised
its East European policy. Soviet presence there no longer seemed as threatening as
in the 1950s, democratic change was occurring in at least some of the satellites
that made them less likely to act as proxies of the Soviet Union. Government doc-
uments reflect a slow and gradual change in the American position on the future
status of Eastern Europe. Continental reunification was no longer on the agenda
and neither was the full restoration of independence. Satellites were not to be en-
couraged to break with the USSR. America would aim at the “development of
Western unity in close association with the U.S. a further loosening (but not sever-
ing) of abnormally tight bonds between the USSR and Eastern Europe, reduction
in divisions between East and West”. In fact the removal of Soviet control could
lead to a more dangerous world. “Unbridled nationalism in Eastern Europe might
lead to possible renewal of the patterns of conflict that made the area such a cock-
pit prior to pax communista. This potential is evident in complex of latent and po-
tentially dangerous territorial and minority issues in the area.”
In 1971 a U.S. diplomat told his audience that the only hope Hungary had for
liberation is if change occurs within the Soviet Union itself. A few years later NSC
aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt recommended organic relations within the Soviet bloc.
There emerged a reform bloc within the Soviet sphere, a situation far from perfect
but “not so bad” for the United States. President Carter even noted in his diary that
there was no Soviet influence in Hungary.
When the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, first in Poland then in Hun-
gary began to disintegrate the Western powers welcomed and supported change
up to the point they threatened to upset the status quo in Europe. The accelerated
pace of transformation in 1989 filled capitals from Vienna to Washington with ap-
prehension.
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By 1989 Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe was seen as a stabilizing factor,
the Warsaw Pact a pillar of European stability. Yet, the communist regimes in
Eastern Europe were in a state of economic and political decline; without reforms
their collapse seemed unavoidable with a potential to destabilize the region. Thus
reforms had to be far reaching enough to keep the East European systems afloat,
yet stop short of regime change. The reason for caution was not mainly the fear of
provoking Soviet intervention, although this may also have been a factor. The
West did not just fail to encourage the movement toward regime change, but actu-
ally tried to impede regime change and Soviet withdrawal. The EEC declared that
it would not allow Comecon states to enter in the foreseeable future many of the
products of which were excluded from the common market. A high official of the
EEC even asserted that it was Hungary’s “duty” to stay in the Warsaw Pact. The
French socialists admonished the Hungarian party not to lose ground to the oppo-
sition. German chancellor Kohl warned the HSWP not to lose control of the levers
of power; Thatcher pleaded with Gorbachev to stay in Eastern Europe; Bush
wanted Jaruzelski to stay and supported communist reformers in Budapest against
the opposition declaring that US-Hungarian relations should not impair Hun-
gary’s relationship with the USSR, he “did not want to cause problems for Hun-
gary or Gorbachev”. Mitterrand’s vision, as he explained in Budapest in January
1990 was a divided continent on a cooperative basis. Once more, national self-de-
termination was seen as contradictory to the principle of stability. Austria, Swit-
zerland and Italy were also much concerned. Austria was worried about refugees
and a potential spillover of crises. For Italy and France the prospect of German
domination in Mitteleuropa was not more appealing than continued Soviet con-
trol – the extent of which was never entirely clear in the Western world.
The main fear was for Gorbachev and his political future which would be in
jeopardy if the Soviets lost Eastern Europe. Gorbachev was not planning on losing
the empire and hoped to contain changes within the confines of “socialism” and
the existing international structure in Europe. He was the first unambiguously
pro-Western Soviet leader, who signed important arms reduction agreements,
therefore his political survival enjoyed priority self-determination. Thus when in
Budapest Bush signaled that although not disinterested in the events, the United
States respected the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence.
In addition, as Lawrence Eagleburger pointed out, a liberated Eastern Europe
may not be a more stable place. Old national rivalries and hostilities may come to
the surface, bringing instability to the region and potentially the continent. Last
but not least, there were French worries that the developments in Eastern Europe
could delay the Maastricht process.
All these concerns led NATO powers to seek the preservation of the interna-
tional system that was based on a divided Europe, albeit on a more cooperative,
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non-competitive basis. The initiative to break with Yalta came from Eastern Eu-
rope, which for the first time since 1918, was able to control its destiny.
The destruction of Austria-Hungary created a highly unstable and vulnerable
space in the middle of Europe. Munich in 1938, the Western non-response to the
Hitler-Stalin pact, the percentage agreement, Truman’s inaction in the years of
Soviet penetration in Eastern Europe were not mistakes in policies dealing with
dictatorial, expansionist powers and the search for a new and lasting European
balance. The history of international relations in the areas between Germany and
Russia needs reinterpretation. The stability/national self-determination paradigm
offers an analytical framework in which it is possible to analyze the policies of
Western powers towards the region between 1918 and 1990. The national inde-
pendence of the weak states in the area is guaranteed by Western powers in case
this condition is seen to be consistent with the principle of stability and security. If
history is a good guide to the future membership in the European Union may guar-
antee that the two conditions will be mutually reinforcing.
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